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ABSTRACT  
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE ONLINE ERA:  
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF NEWS MEDIA CONSUMPTION,  NEW FORMS OF NEWS 
MEDIA, AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
Drawing on data from the moral psychology of political communication and literature 
on news media consumption, this thesis explores the relationships between new forms 
of news media and longstanding trends in the moral psychology of political communi-
cation. By discussing dynamic changes in the form and content of news media, as well 
as the new venues through which it is experienced, this thesis highlights three areas in 
which new forms of media place pressure on existing literature. Namely, it holds that 
the ways in which individuals experience new forms of news media place pressure on 
existing literature centering around the homogeneity of political discussion networks, 
the transmission of political expertise, and the credibility of news media. The implica-
tions of these pressures are numerous and multiply caused, and impel policymakers to 
take seriously questions concerning the regulation of news media content. 
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I. Introduction

	 As a blanket term, political discourse encompasses a broad array of sub-fields 
and areas of specialization. Throughout the literature on the subject, academics have 
deftly toed the line between precision and synthesis. As I am interested in how the 
causal ingredients of political discourse interplay both with one another and new forms 
of media, I will err on the side of synthesis. Necessarily, I owe a word of apology to 
specialists in any part of this enormous subject.

	 Over the past half-century, political discourse in the United States has experi-
enced dynamic changes. These changes have arisen by way of new media methods 
and mediums. Importantly, these changes are multiply caused, and owe debts not only 
to technological, but also political, religious, and racial changes. That is, the state of 
any mass political communication is simultaneously contingent on the culture in which 
it manifests as well as the technological capabilities of that culture. 

	 As these changes have occurred, scholars in numerous fields have committed 
their work to explaining, or, at the very least, describing, the ways in which recent 
changes have arisen. Naturally, some fields of academic literature are particularly well 
positioned to explore the working parts of political communication. In this thesis, I will 
draw on prior research from two such fields: (1) studies of news media consumption, 
and (2) the moral psychology of political communication.

	 Any such thesis, by design, must be committed to synthesis of these disciplines. 
Naturally, any such analysis will do an injustice to the work of specialists in any narrow 
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corner of these fields. That said, I do hope that a discussion of each of these fields will 
empower me to identify tensions within the literature that imply a need for further ex-
ploration.

	 Structurally, this thesis will begin with two literature reviews. First, I will review 
literature on the moral psychology of political communication. This section will explore 
the construction of group identity, the formation of biases based on group identity, the 
impact of threats on group action, the homogeneity of discussion networks, and the 
transmission of expertise. 

	 Directly following will be a literature review on media consumption. Presented in 
two parts, it will consider the role of media consumption both in oﬄine and online for-
mats. The research I address that is pertinent to oﬄine media consumption will center 
around traditional news mediums (television, radio, and print). It will consider both the 
media’s power as agenda-setter and the tension that exists in media programming be-
tween what is profitable to present and what is objectively true to report.

	 The second portion of the media consumption section of this thesis will focus on 
online media consumption. It will address the impacts of online media consumption on 
social capital, political participation, the destabilization of institutions, homogeneity 
within political discussion networks, and the future of political discourse. 

	 From there, I will devote an analysis chapter to achieving three goals. First, I will 
analyze three “pressure points” at which the moral psychology literature implicates that 
the literature on media consumption might be in need of revision. Second, I will specu-
late on the ways in which these themes contribute to- and are exacerbated by- one 
   of  6 49
another. Finally, I will devote closing remarks to exploring the ways in which these 
pressures implicate the agendas of policy makers.

II. Moral psychology of political communication 

	 The moral psychology of political communication can be understood as the 
ways in which an individual’s membership within various groups aﬀects who they dis-
cuss politics with, what they are biased to believe about others, and what motivates 
them to action. Groups can be bound along religious, political, gender, or otherwise 
social lines. Both the content of group identity as well as the eﬀects of it are multiply 
caused and have numerous predictable eﬀects. This section is designed to explore 
both the forces that contribute to group identity, the formation of biases, the impact of 
threats on group action, the homogeneity of discussion networks, and the transmission 
of expertise.

A. Group Identity and Bias

	 Huckfeldt et al (1995) stressed the importance of interpersonal discussion be-
yond the conventional boundaries of massive, cohesive groups. They held that if it is 
true that political communication is bound by strong social groups, then we should ex-
pect the flow of political information to be independent from opinion distributions with-
in the broader communication network.  However, when social communications exist 1
outside of cohesive groups, one would think that information flows should reflect this. 
To test this expectation, Huckfeldt et al considered 1992 Presidential election survey 
results, specifically portions concerned with respondents’ social networks. They found 
 Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul Allen Beck, Russell J. Dalton, and Jeffrey Levine. "Political 1
Environments, Cohesive Social Groups, and the Communication of Public Opin-
ion." American Journal of Political Science 39.4 (1995): 1025-054.
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that in fact, individuals are exposed to larger opinion environments based on the envi-
ronmental patterns of their smaller networks.  Further, they held that citizen micro-net2 -
works serve as valuable lenses for how they will operate within the flow of macro-net-
work political information. Thus, they concluded, the macro-environment of political 
communication relies on the micro-level social groups that engage in political commu-
nication.  That is, perhaps the best way of understanding macro-level trends of political 
discourse is viewing them as fluid reflectors of micro-networks of social groups, family, 
and close acquaintances.

	 One way of understanding group identities is as bias machines. The stronger a 
citizen identifies with their party, the more positively they feel about members of their 
group.  Bias is more linked to group identity than ideological content.  Importantly, de3 4 -
termining the favorability of a policy is much more easily accomplished by considering 
not the policy, but the ideological camp that advocated it.  That is, as individuals tend 5
to care more about relations with group members than abstract ideologies, our political 
opinions are fundamentally rooted in social ground.

	 The role of groups as bias machines can be seen through recurring themes in 
moral psychology research. Group members react more strongly to the emotions of in-
 Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul Allen Beck, Russell J. Dalton, and Jeffrey Levine. "Political 2
Environments, Cohesive Social Groups, and the Communication of Public Opin-
ion." American Journal of Political Science 39.4 (1995): 1025-054.
 Simon, Bernd, Claudia Kulla, and Martin Zobel. "On being More than just a Part of the Whole: 3
Regional Identity and Social Distinctiveness." European Journal of Social Psychology 25.3 
(1995): 325-40. Print.
 Malka, Ariel, and Yphtach Lelkes. "More than Ideology: Conservative–Liberal Identity and Re4 -
ceptivity to Political Cues." Social Justice Research 23.2 (2010): 156-88. Print. 
 Malka, Ariel, and Yphtach Lelkes. "More than Ideology: Conservative–Liberal Identity and Re5 -
ceptivity to Political Cues." Social Justice Research 23.2 (2010): 156-88. Print. 
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group than out-group members.   It is not the mere existence of emotions that arouse 67
citizens, but, importantly, who is expressing them.

	 Further, group biases, once engrained, are extremely diﬃcult to step away from. 
Kunda (1990) found that people are motivated not just to have views that are correct, 
but also to pursue information that supports existing views, even if those positions are 
incorrect.  Commonly referred to in the literature as motivated reasoning, this sort of 8





	 There are various ways to diminish or exacerbate group biases. One reliable ex-
ample of how to exacerbate group (especially out-group) biases is threat. Threat, as I 
will employ the term, can be understood as any communication that calls into question 
the social status or wellbeing of a group.  
	 Increasingly, evidence indicates that groups are bound by what angers or out-
rages them. Brewer and Caporael (2008) suggested that threat plays an important role 
in the interplay of group identity and out-group hostility.  There is evidence that an ex9 -
ternal threat cultivates in-group solidarity and tightens in-group boundaries in exact 
 Chiao, Joan Y., Nicholas E. Bowman, and Harleen Gill. "The Political Gender Gap: Gender 6
Bias in Facial Inferences that Predict Voting Behavior: E3666." PLoS One 3.10 (2008) Print. 
 Jay J. Van Bavel, Dominic J. Packer, and William A. Cunningham. "Modulation of the Fusiform 7
Face Area Following Minimal Exposure to Motivationally Relevant Faces: Evidence of in-Group 
Enhancement (Not Out-Group Disregard)." Journal of cognitive neuroscience 23.11 (2011): 
3343-54. Print.
 Kunda, Ziva. "The case for motivated reasoning." Psychological bulletin 108.3 (1990): 480.8
 Brewer, Marilynn B., and Linnda R. Caporael. "An evolutionary perspective on social 9
identity: Revisiting groups." Evolution and social psychology 143 (2006): 161.
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proportion to the degree of a given threat.  The findings of Roccas and Brewer sug1011 -
gest that threat promotes convergence of identities, and, further, that the less diverse 
the identities with in a group are, the lower tolerance for out-groups will be. 
12
	 The link between a threatened in-group identity and out-group hostility is cor-
roborated by the findings of Pratto and Gladford (2008), who found that when out-
comes for Iraq and the United States did not compete, Americans valued Iraqi and 
American lives equally, but when those nations were in competition for favorable out-
comes Americans overwhelmingly valued American lives more. 
13
	 Within the realm of possible threats, there exists a hierarchy. As group identity is 
caught up in cultural practices and race, one would expect that one’s cultural and 
racial identity have heavy roles in the generation of bias. Sniderman et al (2004) found 
less opposition to unskilled immigrants who might pose an economic threat than to 
immigrants who did not fit into national culture and thus posed a symbolic threat. 
14
	 Within the realm of threat reaction, diﬀerent members within groups react with 
varying degrees of empathy to out-group members. These reactions fall along pre-
dictable lines: namely, the strength with which one identifies with their group. Glasford, 
 Coser, Lewis A. The functions of social conflict. Vol. 9. Routledge, 1956.10
 Levine, Robert A., and Donald T. Campbell. "Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic atti11 -
tudes and group conflict." New York: Wiley. 242 Social identity: international perspectives 
(1972): 271-299.
 Roccas, Sonia, and Marilynn B. Brewer. "Social identity complexity." Personality and Social 12
Psychology Review 6.2 (2002): 88-106.
 Pratto, Felicia, and Demis E. Glasford. "Ethnocentrism and the value of a human life." Journal 13
of personality and social psychology 95.6 (2008): 1411.
 Sniderman, Paul M., Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior. "Predisposing factors and situa14 -
tional triggers: Exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities." American political science review 
98.1 (2004): 35-49.
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Dovidio, and Pratto (2009) found that Americans that strongly identify with national 
identity feel less discomfort than others when told that the United states has bombed 
civilians.  Musgrove and McGarty (2008) found that strong group identifiers react more 15
angrily to threats made about the entire group.  The stronger a person’s partisan aﬃli16 -
ation, the more likely they are to react with feelings of schadenfreude to reading about 
bad things happening to candidates from opposite parties, even if those events nega-
tively aﬀect the country. 
17
	 Further, strong group identity generates strong defensiveness in the face of 
group criticism. Proposing societal explanations (as opposed to individual accountabili-
ty) for low African-American success in business elicited far more defensiveness 
among white students that strongly identified with their race, but led to greater support 
for African-Americans from whites that did not strongly identify with their race.  Low18 -
ery et al (2006) manipulated the eﬀects of employment-related aﬃrmative action pro-
grams and found that whites with a strong white identity were far less supportive when 
the program was framed in terms of white job loss.   Gibson (2008) found, for exam19 -
 Glasford, Demis E., John F. Dovidio, and Felicia Pratto. "I continue to feel so good about us: 15
In-group identification and the use of social identity—Enhancing strategies to reduce intragroup 
dissonance." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 35.4 (2009): 415-427.
 Musgrove, Luke, and Craig McGarty. "Opinion-based group membership as a predictor of col16 -
lective emotional responses and support for pro-and anti-war action." Social Psychology 39.1 
(2008): 37-47.
 Combs, David JY, et al. "Politics, schadenfreude, and in-group identification: The sometimes 17
happy thing about a poor economy and death." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45.4 
(2009): 635-646.
 Andreychik, Michael R., and Michael J. Gill. "In-group identity moderates the impact of social 18
explanations on intergroup attitudes: External explanations are not inherently prosocial." Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin 35.12 (2009): 1632-1645.
 Lowery, Brian S., et al. "Concern for the in-group and opposition to affirmative action." Journal 19
of personality and social psychology 90.6 (2006): 961.
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ple, that black south africans who identify strongly with their ethnic group are less likely 
to believe that justice has been adequately performed when asked to react to an ex-
perimental vignette in which a black squatter is evicted from land on which she is 
squatting.  These findings are corroborated also by history, as whites who felt they 20
were “doing worse” than African-Americans were more likely to support the candidacy 
of George Wallace in 1968. 
21
	 Notably, research suggests that strong partisan identity is joined by religious 
identity among predictors of translating threat into out-group hostility. Religion also 
serves the function of exacerbating out-group attitudes. Tausch et al (2007) found that 
Northern Irish that are strong religious identifiers are more likely to translate perceived 
threats into negative out-group positions.  Further, still, certain personality types are 22
more prone to strong group identity than others: Individuals who have low openness to 
new experiences are stronger partisans.  
23
	 Importantly, threats need not be actual or realized in order to elicit these re-
sponses. Scheepers and Ellemers (2005) found that a possible decline in high socioe-
 Gibson, James L. "Group identities and theories of justice: An experimental investigation into 20
the justice and injustice of land squatting in South Africa." The Journal of Politics 70.3 (2008): 
700-716.
 Vanneman, Reeve D., and Thomas F. Pettigrew. "Race and relative deprivation in the urban 21
United States." Race 13.4 (1972): 461-486.
 Tausch, Nicole, et al. "Cross‐community contact, perceived status differences, and intergroup 22
attitudes in Northern Ireland: The mediating roles of individual‐level versus group‐level threats 
and the moderating role of social identification." Political Psychology 28.1 (2007): 53-68.
 Gerber, Alan S., et al. "Personality and political attitudes: Relationships across issue domains 23
and political contexts." American Political Science Review 104.1 (2010): 111-133.
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conomics status was just as stressful as being assigned a low socioeconomic status.  24
Threat need not be tied to actual outcomes, but only perceived as producing adverse 
outcomes for group members. 

	 Threat aﬀects not just group identity, but also the way that group identity inter-
acts with approval of various political positions. Kam and Ramos (2008) find that during 
time of national threats, national identity shapes presidential approval, whereas during 
un-threatened, or “normal” political environments, partisan identity drives presidential 
approval.  Importantly, this exists at a level beneath ideology, at the social level. 
25
	 There are actionable consequences to feeling threatened. A multitude of re-
search suggests that if groups feel threatened, they are much more likely to translate 
the threat into outrage, and their commitment to action and fervor of group identity be-
come boosted.  Within the vein of outrage generation, there are very specific sorts of 2627
political candidates that benefit from its promulgation. Lambert et al (2010) found that 
anger increases support of pro-war candidates. 
28
 Scheepers, Daan, Naomi Ellemers, and Nieska Sintemaartensdijk. "Suffering from the possi24 -
bility of status loss: Physiological responses to social identity threat in high status groups." Eu-
ropean Journal of Social Psychology 39.6 (2009): 1075-1092.
 Kam, Cindy D., and Jennifer M. Ramos. "Joining and leaving the rally: Understanding the 25
surge and decline in presidential approval following 9/11." Public Opinion Quarterly 72.4 (2008): 
619-650.
 Leach, Colin Wayne, Aarti Iyer, and Anne Pedersen. "Anger and guilt about ingroup advan26 -
tage explain the willingness for political action." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32.9 
(2006): 1232-1245.
 Mackie, Diane M., Thierry Devos, and Eliot R. Smith. "Intergroup emotions: explaining offen27 -
sive action tendencies in an intergroup context." Journal of personality and social psychology 
79.4 (2000): 602.
 Lambert, Alan J., et al. "Rally effects, threat, and attitude change: an integrative approach to 28
understanding the role of emotion." Journal of personality and social psychology 98.6 (2010): 
886.
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	 Just as it is possible to motivate people to political action with threatening mes-
sages, there are other sorts of messages that predictably stifle political action.  An-
solabehere and Iyengar (1994) found that negative advertising serves as a massively 
demobilizing force, especially among centrists and non-partisans.  Within negative 29
news, there is the sub-genre of news that purports to be threatening or angering. Mar-
cus (2000) found that threats, with almost automatic regularity, jolt citizens from their 
normal cognitive routines and increase the seeking of new information. 
30
	 These things in mind, it is not unreasonable to suggest that given the moral psy-
chology of group identity, the messages that are most successful at mobilizing citizens 
will call into question racial, religious, and cultural status, and will foster the conver-
gence of group identities, out-group hostilities, and support for candidates that can be 
viewed as militaristic. Further, it is possible to mobilize with threatening messages and 
demobilize with negative advertising. Finally, these trends fall along very specific lines 
of group commitment. Those most closely tied to a group identity are more likely than 
others to be mobilized by threatening messages, and those who have no strong group 
aﬃliations are more likely than others to be demobilized by negative advertising. 

C. Homogeneity of discussion networks

	 Delving into the sub-genre of group behavior that is political communication, the 
most eﬀective check on the rise of convergent group identities is a diversity of voices 
within a given group. Parsons (2010) illustrated the positive eﬀects of dissent, finding 
 Ansolabehere, Stephen and Shanto Iyengar. Going negative: How political advertisements 29
shrink and polarize the electorate. The Free Press,, 1997.
 Marcus, George E. "Emotions in politics." Annual Review of Political Science 3.1 (2000): 221-30
250.
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that the presence of dissenting opinions decreases the polarization of reactive emo-
tions.  
31
	 There is a level on which the literature suggests that traditional networks insu-
late, almost necessarily, against great amounts of homogeneity. Huckfeldt et al (2013) 
described a framework in which political discussion networks are unlikely to become 
too homogenous, as they are like a neighborhood: we can choose which neighborhood 
we live in, but not our actual neighbors, and not whether our neighbors ask for our par-
ticipation in political initiatives.   Klofstad (2009) argued that political discussion net32 -
works are not constructed in order to manufacture political homogeneity, as they often 
include people at work and various other social functions over whom you have no con-
trol of choosing.   
33
	 However, there is a great deal of evidence that the “neighborhood view” of polit-
ical discussion is not as convincing as it might, at first, appear. Even if we can agree 
that, as Sears and Freedman (1967) suggested, there is little evidence that people con-
sciously attempt to avoid information that conflicts with their views, we may maintain 
that insulation from significant amounts of disparate views still exists.  
34
	 This phenomenon of unintentional homogeneity was explored by Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1995), who described a sort of “de facto selectivity,” in which people simply 
 Parsons, Bryan M. "Social networks and the affective impact of political disagreement." Politi31 -
cal Behavior 32.2 (2010): 181-204.
 Huckfeldt, Robert, et al. "Networks, interdependence, and social influence in politics." (2013).32
 Klofstad, Casey A., Scott D. McClurg, and Meredith Rolfe. "Measurement of political discus33 -
sion networks: A comparison of two “name generator” procedures." Public Opinion Quarterly 
73.3 (2009): 462-483.
 Sears, David O., and Jonathan L. Freedman. "Selective exposure to information: A critical re34 -
view." Public Opinion Quarterly 31.2 (1967): 194-213.
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find themselves in discussion networks that tend to be politically homogenous and 
thus reinforce their existing views.  While there may be no bias in information seeking, 35
they contended, there may well be bias in the information to which people are ex-
posed. Thus, homogeneity can be created even absent intentionality. 

	 Further, people tend to overestimate the extent to which their networks are di-
verse. Stromer-Galley (2003) found as a result of seventy interviews with people who 
converse about political topics online that people tend to believe that they engage with 
a diversity of opinions whilst online.  There was a deep-seated appreciation for this 36
diversity among most respondents, even if that diversity included oﬀensively racist of 
misogynistic viewpoints.  All of this supports the hypothesis that generally, people 37
tend to value diversity of opinion in political communication. This comes, of course, as 
a rebuttal to the idea that online users actively seek out opinions similar to their own. 

	 Importantly, all of this references how individuals perceive their own actions, not 
what those actions actually consist of. If anything is clear from the rest of the literature, 
it is that people often unwittingly become members of ideological silos whilst online. 
The value of this research is not that it rebuts that fact, but that it evidences that at a 
basic level, people do not intentionally enter ideologically homogenous groups- that if it 
happens, it occurs at an unintentional level.

D. Transmission of expertise:

 Huckfeldt, R. Robert, and John Sprague. Citizens, politics and social communication: Infor35 -
mation and influence in an election campaign. Cambridge University Press, 1995.
 Stromer‐Galley, Jennifer. "Diversity of political conversation on the Internet: Users' perspec36 -
tives." Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication 8.3 (2003): 0-0.
 Stromer‐Galley, Jennifer. "Diversity of political conversation on the Internet: Users' perspec37 -
tives." Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication 8.3 (2003): 0-0.
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	 As late as 2001, citizens were reasonably good at estimating the political exper-
tise of others. Huckfeldt (2001) found that discussants, in terms of political knowledge, 
fared roughly in correlation to how their peers predicted.  Interestingly, there is no evi38 -
dence that people, even if they can recognize who experts are, weigh expert opinions 
more heavily than non-expert opinions.   However, Huckfeldt also found that citizens 39
are more likely to converse with people they perceive are experts more frequently than 
non experts. Further, he held that people who perceive themselves to be experts are 
more willing to share their opinions than others. These things in mind, it is arguably the 
case that social communication produces the “right” result (consultation with experts), 
but through a method with one major weakness: the non-weighting of expert opinions 
as more important. Essentially, expert voices override non-experts in political commu-
nication networks, but because experts speak, and are listened to, more often, not be-
cause their views are thought to be of more value. This leaves open an alarming possi-
bility for the transmission of expertise: if a media could permit participation of an abun-
dance “self-perceived experts” with little actual knowledge, people could become 
over-saturated with non-expert opinions and cease heeding expert opinions.  
III.  News Media Consumption

	 Michael Schudson seeks to highlight the neglect of political science literature 
with respect to the news media as a political institution.  He feels that this neglect has 40
Huckfeldt, Robert. "The social communication of political expertise." American Journal of Polit38 -
ical Science (2001): 425-438.
 Huckfeldt, R. Robert, and John Sprague. Citizens, politics and social communication: Infor39 -
mation and influence in an election campaign. Cambridge University Press, 1995.
 Schudson, Michael. "The News Media as Political Institutions." Annual Review of Political 40
Science 5.1 (2002): 249-69. Print. 
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occurred in spite of the long history of politically funded newspapers and scholars who 
increasingly refer to the “mediatization” of political discourse. When evaluating the 
news media as a political institution, three schools of theory emerge. First, political 
economy views highlight media ownership and the behavior of news institutions.  A 41
second family of theory focuses on the social organization of news media and consid-
ers news content in light of daily interactions of reporters and their sources.  Finally, 42
the third style of research views the news as a cultural phenomenal that incorporates 
our belief systems and values into narratives, but does so unconsciously.  The litera43 -
ture in this section will variously represent research from each of these schools, seek-
ing to decipher the role of news media as a political institution. Understanding news 
media as a political institution begs a question: what, then, is the news media’s power?

	 In order to answer this question, this chapter is divided into two parts: (1) re-
search on news media consumption before the advent of the internet, and (2) news 
media consumption in the online era. The first section will consider news media’s role 
as agenda-setter, as well as its often discussed “objectivity problem,” as brought on by 
the tension between profitable sensationalism and objectivity. The second section will 
discuss the internet’s relationship with the generation of social capital, political partici-
pation, the destabilization of institutions, homogeneity within political discussion net-
works, and the future of political discourse.

 Schudson, Michael. "The News Media as Political Institutions." Annual Review of Political 41
Science 5.1 (2002): 249-69. Print. 
 Schudson, Michael. "The News Media as Political Institutions." Annual Review of Political 42
Science 5.1 (2002): 249-69. Print. 
 Schudson, Michael. "The News Media as Political Institutions." Annual Review of Political 43
Science 5.1 (2002): 249-69. Print. 
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	 The literature suggests that in experiencing news media, readers internalize not 
just information about a given issue, but also, importantly, how much significance to 
attach to that issue based on the amount of information in a news story and its position 
within the media outlet’s programming. The mass news media, through its ordering of 
programming, determines the important issues, thus “setting” the agenda of cam-
paigns.  McCombs and Shaw (1972) found a near-perfect correlation between the or-
dering of issues as “important” by the public and the amount of time given those is-
sues in the news media.  Part of news media’s power lies in its ability to inflate what is 44
important to people, regardless of whether or not it should be. Not to lean too far for-
ward in scope, but understanding the news media in this way might help explain why a 
nation may become transfixed on issues that bear seemingly no relevance to the ques-
tion of how a candidate for political oﬃce might govern. 

	 Within this agenda-setting authority, media outlets gain or lose power based on 
their reputation. Deephouse (2000) explored the role of media reputation as a means of 
generating capital gains for media outlets. Defining media reputation as the overall 
evaluation of a firm presented in the media, and found a positive correlation between 
the reputations of media outlets and capital gains made by financial backers.  Thus, 45
news media outlets have vested interests in being reputable.  
	 (2) The objectivity problem

 McCombs, Maxwell E., and Donald L. Shaw. "The agenda-setting function of mass media." 44
Public opinion quarterly 36.2 (1972): 176-187.
 Deephouse, David L. "Media reputation as a strategic resource: An integration of mass com45 -
munication and resource-based theories." Journal of management 26.6 (2000): 1091-1112.
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	 Pressure is placed on the “reputation” literature in a curious way. Typically, we 
think of journalistic reputation as being closely tied to credibility. While this may be true 
of news media outlets, a stress arises on the credibility front: namely, the tension be-
tween what is profitable to report and what is responsible to report. Deephouse (2000) 
held that the implications of this tension are far-reaching, not least of which being that 
the tension between reporting the truth and garnering profit presents a dilemma for 
media outlets in that it potentially degrades their objectivity in favor of that which leads 
them to be highly rated, or “reputable.”  This tension leads, then, to a distinction that 46
might seem counterintuitive: increasingly, reputable, when used in reference to news 
media outlets, becomes conflated with being highly rated. 

	 The literature reflects that certain media marketing and content strategies prove 
more useful to the end of generating profit than others. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) 
argued that the movements that most successfully utilize media focus their attention 
on audience size, the visual aspects of media, and emphasize the thematic and enter-
tainment values of their messages.  Importantly, this research is corroborated by other 47
literature within the field to the extent that it suggests that successful messages in 
modern media tend to be brief, sensational, and thematically framed. 
48
	 Delving more specifically into this tension, Savigny (2002) contended that the 
sphere of political communication is defined by a tension between free market and ob-
 Deephouse, David L. "Media reputation as a strategic resource: An integration of mass com46 -
munication and resource-based theories." Journal of management 26.6 (2000): 1091-1112.
 Gamson, William A., and Gadi Wolfsfeld. "Movements and media as interacting systems." 47
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 528.1 (1993): 114-125.
 Bouza F. The impact area of political communication: citizenship faced with public discourse. 48
International Review Of Sociology [serial online]. July 2004;14(2):245-259. 
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jective, democratic principles.  That is, by competition between the interest in reelec49 -
tion by politicians and the interest in profit by the media. The author held that this ten-
sion would result in political debates becoming increasingly about theater rather than 
the exploration of ideology. 
50
	 Bouza (2004) considered the role of public communication in radicalizing opin-
ions within public discourse. Specifically, Bouza viewed this issue through the lens of 
television, to the extent that it is a source of political news. Importantly, television dic-
tates that political parties must necessarily adjust messages to the needs of television 
formatting, which Bouza believed has a constricting impact on the length and informa-
tion content of messages.  The consequences of this, he held, are far-reaching, em51 -
phasizing that political rhetoric is altered within television to become more 
sensational. 
52
	 The work of Pan and Kosicki (1993) explored the friction between the objective 
and the sensational aspects of media by studying a phenomena referred to in the liter-
ature as framing- namely, the ways in which issues are presented with the goal of pro-
mulgating not objective truth, but a specific narrative designed to bolster the ratings of 
a certain interest group.  They identified four methods- syntactical, script, thematic, 53
 Savigny, Heather. "Public opinion, political communication and the internet." Politics 22.1 49
(2002): 1-8.
 Savigny, Heather. "Public opinion, political communication and the internet." Politics 22.1 50
(2002): 1-8.
 Bouza F. The impact area of political communication: citizenship faced with public discourse. 51
International Review Of Sociology [serial online]. July 2004;14(2):245-259. 
 Bouza F. The impact area of political communication: citizenship faced with public discourse. 52
International Review Of Sociology [serial online]. July 2004;14(2):245-259. 
 Pan, Zhongdang, and Gerald M. Kosicki. "Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse." 53
Political communication 10.1 (1993): 55-75.
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and rhetorical structures- that news media outlets choose to frame issues through.  In 54
their conceptual framework, these can be understood not as competing methods, but 
rather coexisting tools to achieve the common goal of framing narratives and manufac-
turing political opinions. 
55
	 Importantly, the literature of oﬄine media consumption is marked by a belief that 
the media, due to a need to appeal to large audiences, remains mostly objective. Mutz 
(2001) employed national survey data to analyze how many politically dissimilar views 
people are exposed to based on the sorts of political information that they consume. 
She contended that individual ability to control their selective exposure to news is the 
key variable in determining whether a source translates into exposure of dissimilar 
views.  Importantly, she found that individuals are exposed to far more dissimilar 56
views on news media than in interpersonal discussion networks. 
57
	 Her findings apply pressure to the common misconception that news media 
promulgates similar views by finding that individual discussant networks tend to be far 
more homogenous than news media agendas. This is due, Mutz believed, to the im-
personal nature of news media- that is, news media has less of a vested interest in get-
ting along with specific individuals, and thus caters messages to broader audiences 
than interpersonal discussion networks can allow or account for.

 Pan, Zhongdang, and Gerald M. Kosicki. "Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse." 54
Political communication 10.1 (1993): 55-75.
 Pan, Zhongdang, and Gerald M. Kosicki. "Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse." 55
Political communication 10.1 (1993): 55-75.
  Mutz, Diana C. "Facilitating Communication across Lines of Political Difference: The Role of 56
Mass Media." American Political Science Review 95.1 (2001): 97-114. 
 Mutz, Diana C. "Facilitating Communication across Lines of Political Difference: The Role of 57
Mass Media." American Political Science Review 95.1 (2001): 97-114. 
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B.  Online Media Consumption

	 It would do an injustice to the complexity of the last two decades to formally 
treat the internet age as a monolith. There are at least two significant functions of the 
internet that entail vastly diﬀerent user experiences. First, the internet can be under-
stood as the greatest and most thorough storehouse of information that mankind has 
ever created. Second, it can be viewed in terms of its function of being a vehicle 
through which interactive social media on a mass scale is made possible. Importantly, 
these functions exist in increasingly overlapping magisteria. Social media hubs like 
Facebook aggregate individuals’ social life and news media into a single platform. Giv-
en their interrelationship, it would do a disservice to treat the internet solely as an in-
formation aggregate or social facilitator. Thus, this section of the literature review will 
explore both functions.	 

	 Dimaggio, Hargittai, Neuman, and Robinson (2001) provided a meta-analysis 
considers the sociological implications of the internet on society. Their research de-
scribed the ways in which the internet as a medium is uniquely situated to integrated 
modes of communication that had heretofore been necessarily exclusive.  They held 58
that the internet does not constrict or displace current longstanding behaviors, but 
rather complement the ways in which they are experienced.  Further, they hold that 59
the implications of social media are not determined solely by the internet itself, but 
 DiMaggio, Paul, et al. "Social implications of the Internet." Annual review of sociology 27.1 58
(2001): 307-336.
 DiMaggio, Paul, et al. "Social implications of the Internet." Annual review of sociology 27.1 59
(2001): 307-336.
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rather are multiply caused by the economic, legal, and policy decisions of various na-
tions in which social media plays an active part. 
60
	 Gurevitch, Coleman, and Blumler (2009) explored political communication as it is 
aﬀected by changing media landscapes. They held that many of the trends of television 
media such as its emphasis on the visual aspects of news have persisted into the in-
ternet age, but that others, like television’s broadcast-centered model of presentation, 
have necessarily been constrained.  They believed that the internet would create an 61
evermore instantaneous feedback loop capable of constricting the length and sensa-
tionalizing the content of media messages.  The internet, they held, would have con62 -
flicting eﬀects on political discourse to the extent that it will allow more participation 
than ever before, but that participation will be marked by content of brief and theatrical 
rather than substantive nature. 	 
63
	 (1)  Social functions of internet communication

	  The information functions of the internet also include social functions, as the 
internet is a hub for online forums, discussion boards, and news media aggregates. 
Social media hubs like Facebook aggregate individuals’ social life and news media into 
a single platform. Shah et al (2001) analyzed the internet’s role in individuals’ genera-
 DiMaggio, Paul, et al. "Social implications of the Internet." Annual review of sociology 27.1 60
(2001): 307-336.
 Gurevitch, Michael, Stephen Coleman, and Jay G. Blumler. "Political communication—Old 61
and new media relationships." The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 625.1 (2009): 164-181.
 62
 Gurevitch, Michael, Stephen Coleman, and Jay G. Blumler. "Political communication—Old 63
and new media relationships." The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 625.1 (2009): 164-181.
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tion of social capital. In order to study this, they considered internet use through the 
lens of individual motivations in order to highlight diﬀerences between types of internet 
use. Through an analysis of the DDB’s 1999 lifestyle study, they found users’ employ-
ment of the internet for social purposes to be positively correlated with social capital, 
whereas more recreational uses of technology were found to negatively correlate with 
social capital.  Shah et al importantly held that while the internet can indeed be a 64
means of generating social capital, the adoption of new media for social gain is not a 
singularity but rather the norm in the history of technological advancement. 
65
	 (2) Political participation

	 Xenos and Moy (2007) examined the eﬀects of the role of the internet with re-
spect to political and civil engagement within a changing media landscape. They found 
that internet use directly influences information acquisition, but political and civic en-
gagement are contingent eﬀects of internet use.  Through this lens, they advocated 66
that importantly, we must study the internet not as an isolated phenomenon, but as a 
deeply complex one with numerous notable externalities. 

	 Tolbert and Ramona (2003)  observed the role of the internet as an information 
machine. They held that since it increases voter information about elections, we should 
 Shah, V. Nojin Kwak, R. Lance Holbert, Dhavan. "Connecting" and "Disconnecting" With Civic 64
Life: Patterns of Internet Use and the Production of Social Capital." Political Communication 
18.2 (2001): 141-62.
 Shah, V. Nojin Kwak, R. Lance Holbert, Dhavan. "Connecting" and "Disconnecting" With Civic 65
Life: Patterns of Internet Use and the Production of Social Capital." Political Communication 
18.2 (2001): 141-62.
 Xenos, Michael, and Patricia Moy. "Direct and differential effects of the Internet on political 66
and civic engagement." Journal of communication 57.4 (2007): 704-718.
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expect political participation to increase.  In accordance with survey data, they found 67
that citizens with internet access were far more likely to report having voted in the 1996 
and 2000 presidential elections. Findings held that internet access increased the prob-
ability of voting by 12% among respondents.  In short, they concluded that their is a 68
positive correlation between internet access and the likelihood that an individual votes.

	 Expanding on this research, Kenski and Stroud (2006) analyzed the intersection 
of internet usage and political eﬃcacy, knowledge, and participation. Through the lens 
of the 2000 National Annenberg Survey, they focused on the interrelation between ac-
cess to the internet and exposure to political information. Their research found that po-
litical eﬃcacy, knowledge, and participation are positively correlated with online expo-
sure to political information.  These associations persisted even when accounting for 69
the various political interests, party aﬃliation and the strength of that aﬃliation, and ex-
posure to other forms of political media. 
70
	 Though considering the speculative research of the last section is valuable, it is 
also important to mention work that deals directly with the resultant eﬀects of the rise 
of social media. Tufekci and Wilson (2012) considered the ways in which social media 
allows people to diﬀerently participate in political protest. In short, they note that social 
 Tolbert, Caroline J., and Ramona S. Mcneal. "Unraveling the Effects of the Internet on Politi67 -
cal Participation?" Political Research Quarterly 56.2 (2003): 175-85.
 Tolbert, Caroline J., and Ramona S. Mcneal. "Unraveling the Effects of the Internet on Politi68 -
cal Participation?" Political Research Quarterly 56.2 (2003): 175-85.
 Kenski, Kate, and Natalie Jomini Stroud. "Connections between Internet use and political effi69 -
cacy, knowledge, and participation." Journal of broadcasting & electronic media 50.2 (2006): 
173-192.
Kenski, Kate, and Natalie Jomini Stroud. "Connections between Internet use and political effi70 -
cacy, knowledge, and participation." Journal of broadcasting & electronic media 50.2 (2006): 
173-192.
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media outlets like Facebook provide sources of information that were uncontrollable by 
strict information regimes. It is precisely that sort of information, they held, that played 
crucial roles in citizens’ decisions to participate in protests.  They highlighted that 71
people learned about the Egypt protests through, in large part, Facebook.  That is, 72
their findings suggest that controlling for all other things, social media participation 
greatly increased the likelihood of political participation.

	 The internet also allows candidates for political oﬃce to participate in the politi-
cal process like never before. Rachel Gong’s case study of the impact of blogging on 
the 2008 Malaysian general election delved into the social processes surrounding the 
internet’s impact on politics. Gong contended that in instances in which internet ac-
cessibility is broadened, that very broadening tends to significantly benefit opposition 
candidates, as blogging oﬀers chances to voice opinions not aﬀorded them by state-
controlled media.  Specifically, she held that candidates who blog are seven times 73
more likely to win elections compared to candidates that do not.  Finally, she used 74
anecdotal evidence to suggest that blogs might have gains not only in political net-
works, but also in interpersonal ones.

	 (3) Destabilization of institutions

 Tufekci, Zeynep, and Christopher Wilson. "Social media and the decision to participate in po71 -
litical protest: Observations from Tahrir Square." Journal of Communication 62.2 (2012): 
363-379.
 Tufekci, Zeynep, and Christopher Wilson. "Social media and the decision to participate in po72 -
litical protest: Observations from Tahrir Square." Journal of Communication 62.2 (2012): 
363-379.
 Gong, Rachel. “Internet Politics and State Media Control: Candidate Weblogs in Malaysia.” 73
Sociological Perspectives, vol. 54, no. 3, 2011, pp. 307–328.
 Gong, Rachel. “Internet Politics and State Media Control: Candidate Weblogs in Malaysia.” 74
Sociological Perspectives, vol. 54, no. 3, 2011, pp. 307–328.
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	 Consistently, the literature refers imprecisely to a “destabilization of political in-
stitutions” brought on by new forms of media. But what, exactly, might this mean? 
Bryant and Miron (2004) delved into just how political institutions are destabilized by 
mass media communication. One prime example of this is unfolding events, during 
which reporters often appear as “blithering idiots trying to describe and explain some-
thing that no longer exists.”  The reasons posited for this include the drastic changes 75
in the form, content, and substance of mass media, due largely to the emergence of 
interactive media brought on by the internet.  Further, their research posited that this 76
newly interactive nature of online news media pressures conventional media into forgo-
ing substance for entertainment, a trend which further destabilizes the traditionally-sta-
ble credibility of media institutions. 
77
	 These positions are corroborated Dahlgren (2005), who provided a bird’s-eye 
view of the ways in which the internet interacts with political communication. His 
framework drew from the three main analytic approaches to understanding the interac-
tion of the internet and political discourse more broadly. Dahlgren considered the role 
of the internet as being primarily concerned with the destabilization of longstanding 
political communication systems, to the extent that it amplified voices from areas other 
 Bryant, Jennings, and Dorina Miron. "Theory and research in mass communication." Journal 75
of communication 54.4 (2004): 662-704.
 Bryant, Jennings, and Dorina Miron. "Theory and research in mass communication." Journal 76
of communication 54.4 (2004): 662-704.
 Bryant, Jennings, and Dorina Miron. "Theory and research in mass communication." Journal 77
of communication 54.4 (2004): 662-704.
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than traditional news media outlets.  In Dahlgren’s view, the internet both enters into 78
and contributes to the destabilization of news media outlets.  
79
	 Uslaner (2004) considered the question of whether or the internet promotes or 
degrades social and civic trust.  Evaluating data from the Pew Center for the Internet 
and American Life, his findings supported the idea that internet users have broader so-
cial networks than non-internet users.  Importantly, though, internet users overwhelm80 -
ingly interact with individuals that they know from personal interactions in their daily 
lives.  He found that internet users distrust strangers at levels on par with people who 81
do not engage in internet use.  That said, people who normally exhibit high levels of 82
social trust are more likely to trust strangers on the internet.  Thus, Uslaner concluded 83
that the internet has little eﬀect on the social trust of its participants, but rather that 
when online, people merely exhibit existing levels of social trust or mistrust.

	 Bennett and Iyengar (2008) explored the rapid expansion of discussion networks 
on social media and their ability to connect individuals who were unable to previously 
network. They found that social media created information channels that were both 
 Dahlgren, Peter. "The Internet, public spheres, and political communication: Dispersion and 78
deliberation." Political communication 22.2 (2005): 147-162.
 Dahlgren, Peter. "The Internet, public spheres, and political communication: Dispersion and 79
deliberation." Political communication 22.2 (2005): 147-162.
 Uslaner, Eric M. "Trust, Civic Engagement, and the Internet." Political Communication 21.2 80
(2004): 223-42.
 Uslaner, Eric M. "Trust, Civic Engagement, and the Internet." Political Communication 21.2 81
(2004): 223-42.
 Uslaner, Eric M. "Trust, Civic Engagement, and the Internet." Political Communication 21.2 82
(2004): 223-42.
 Uslaner, Eric M. "Trust, Civic Engagement, and the Internet." Political Communication 21.2 83
(2004): 223-42.
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more proliferated and individualized than previous networks allowed for.  Further, they 84
held that this proliferation and individualization are due to a paradigm shift in media 
models.  Previously, media was consumed through very few information channels that 85
were promulgated through a small set of mass media outlets. According to Bennett 
and Iyengar, the traditional model described above has been replaced by media in 
which far more individuals are allowed to participate in the promulgation of information, 
thus destabilizing the cohesion of media narratives.  
86
	 It is not merely cohesion, though, that is destabilized by the proliferation of new 
media models brought on by social media. Though the expansion of the public square 
is largely thought to be positive, it does have drawbacks that destabilize the legitimacy 
of news media. McPherson (2015) analyzed the ways in which the expansion of partic-
ipants in political communication due to technology has resulted in a crisis of credibili-
ty. She considered an instance in 2014 in which a viral video purporting to represent 
the Syrian crisis was found to have actually been filmed privately in Malta years prior.  87
This sort of phenomenon, according to McPherson, presents issues of credibility to 
new forms of media. Further, she contends, it presents a bit of a paradox: expanding 
networks to include more people makes media more democratic than ever before, 
 Bennett, W. Lance, and Shanto Iyengar. "A new era of minimal effects? The changing founda84 -
tions of political communication." Journal of Communication 58.4 (2008): 707-731.
 Bennett, W. Lance, and Shanto Iyengar. "A new era of minimal effects? The changing founda85 -
tions of political communication." Journal of Communication 58.4 (2008): 707-731.
 Bennett, W. Lance, and Shanto Iyengar. "A new era of minimal effects? The changing founda86 -
tions of political communication." Journal of Communication 58.4 (2008): 707-731.
 McPherson, E., 2015. Digital Human Rights Reporting by Civilian Witnesses: Surmounting 87
the Verification Barrier. In R. A. Lind, ed. Producing Theory in a Digital World 2.0: The Intersec-
tion of Audiences and Production in Contemporary Theory. New York, NY: Peter Lang Publish-
ing, pp. 193–209.
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while the decreased credibility due to that very expansion serves to undermine the in-
tegrity of the information flows on which society is based. 
88
	 (4) Homogeneity of online discussion networks

	 On the homogeneity of discussion networks, Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) ad-
dressed a common question within literature on the sociology of political communica-
tion: namely, does online communication lend itself to exposure to dissenting political 
views? They analyzed this question through national survey data completed by Ameri-
can citizens who regularly participate in online discussion forums like social media. 
They found that the areas in which people are exposed to the most disagreement are 
forums in which politics is an occasional topic, but not the driving force or primary rea-
son for the existence of the space.  Implications abound. First, it implies that online 89
venues designed specifically to achieve the end of facilitating political communication 
tend to result in more ideologically homogenous discussions than other venues. Sec-
ond, it suggests that the internet can provide exposure to dissenting political views, but 
mainly through indirect and unintentional associations. Finally, this research suggests 
that one of the trademark of political communication is that often, the ways in which 
we perceive our behavior do not align with the ways that we do, in fact, behave. This 
final trend is supported throughout the literature and sociological literature more broad-
 McPherson, E., 2015. Digital Human Rights Reporting by Civilian Witnesses: Surmounting 88
the Verification Barrier. In R. A. Lind, ed. Producing Theory in a Digital World 2.0: The Intersec-
tion of Audiences and Production in Contemporary Theory. New York, NY: Peter Lang Publish-
ing, pp. 193–209.
 Wojcieszak, Magdalena E., and Diana C. Mutz. "Online groups and political discourse: Do 89
online discussion spaces facilitate exposure to political disagreement?." Journal of communica-
tion 59.1 (2009): 40-56.
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ly, to the extent that it evidences how unskilled we are at self-assessment of our be-
haviors and their intentional and unintentional eﬀects. 

	 (5) Implications for future political communication

	 Castells (2007) considered the interrelationship between communication and 
power relationships in the technological sense. It analyzed the network society de-
scribed elsewhere in sociological literature as Habermasian. Castells argued that online 
media outlets have become the very social space where power is communicated and 
deliberated on.  It held that there exists a casual relationship between politics, media 90
politics, the politics of scandal, and debates over political legitimacy.  It noted that 91
given an increase in internet participation and wireless communication networks, new 
forms of politics and social movements are more capable of aﬀecting change in the po-
litical sphere.  Further, it contended that mass media and old communication net92 -
works are beginning to converge. The result of this, he concluded, is a historic shift 
from institutionally-driven communication to a communication space dominated by 
new forms of mass media communication such as social media.  
93
	 Craig Calhoun (1988) framed the expansion of media channels of political com-
munication in terms of its impact on populism. Calhoun held that changes in the pat-
tern of communication have fundamentally altered and expanded the groups of people 
 Castells, Manuel. Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society. In90 -
ternational Journal of Communication, [S.l.], v. 1, p. 29, feb. 2007.
 Castells, Manuel. Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society. In91 -
ternational Journal of Communication, [S.l.], v. 1, p. 29, feb. 2007.
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included in the levers of democracy.  Further, he described this alteration as a scale 94
that gave evermore influences to the voices of individual actors, at the expense of the 
power of mass media institutions.  Lance Bennett ’s (1998) work concurs with Cal95 -
houn, to the extent that it also predicted the expansion of media in evermore personal-
ized ways. He thought that this would function to destabilize institutions such as politi-
cal parties and mass media.  He believed that a consequence of this destabilization 96
would be evermore inclusive channels for participation in political discourse that would 
collapse into populism. 
97
	 Furthering research on the expansion of media channels, Blumler and Kavanagh 
(1999) believed that we now exist in what they called the “third age” of media commu-
nication.  This age, they held, is characterized by media abundance, populism, and 98
heightened competitive pressures of conventional media to justify its existence. 
99
	 Scholars like Bruce Bimber (1998) focused not just on the democratization of 
media participation, but also on its ramifications on media content. He believed that 
the internet would contribute to the fragmentation of interest-based group politics and 
 Calhoun, Craig. "Populist politics, communications media and large scale societal 94
integration." Sociological theory (1988): 219-241.
 Calhoun, Craig. "Populist politics, communications media and large scale societal 95
integration." Sociological theory (1988): 219-241.
 Bennett, W. Lance. "The Uncivic Culture: Communication, Identity, and the Rise of Lifestyle 96
Politics." PS: Political Science & Politics 31.4 (1998): 740.
 Bennett, W. Lance. "The Uncivic Culture: Communication, Identity, and the Rise of Lifestyle 97
Politics." PS: Political Science & Politics 31.4 (1998): 740.
 Blumler, Jay G., and Dennis Kavanagh. "The Third Age of Political Communication: Influ98 -
ences and Features." Political Communication 16.3 (1999): 209-30.
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shift discourse in the direction of more fluid, issue-based group politics.  Bimber 100
viewed this not as a contradiction of commonly held narratives about populism, but 
rather as an accelerated form of them capable of eroding the role of institutions in so-
ciety.  
101
	 Dahlgren (2005) highlighted positive consequences that the internet has had on 
political discourse, such as the extent to which it “extends and pluralizes the public 
sphere.”  Castells (2008) concurred, predicting that over the next decade, news 102
forms of communication such as social media would result in the dissemination of in-
formation by more inputs and through more channels, resulting in the increase of politi-
cal participation and the further complication of political communication networks. 
103
	 Having considered the research above, trends emerge. It appears that the inter-
net’s impacts on news media are far reaching to the extent that it can serve as a venue 
for social gain and increased political participation. Further, though, it also functions as 
a de-stabilizer of traditional news media structures, to the extent that it democratizes 
the public square in ways that were previously impossible. 

 Bimber, Bruce. "The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, Community, and Accel100 -
erated Pluralism." Polity 31.1 (1998): 133-60.
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IV. Discussion

	 There is debate as to whether or not the net eﬀects of social media on political 
discourse are positive or negative. Shelley Boulianne’s 2009 meta-analysis of studies 
surrounding the internet’s relationship with political communication, after examining 
166 eﬀects as analyzed through 38 studies of the internet’s role in political communica-
tion, argues that the internet is having neither a largely positive nor largely negative im-
pact on political engagement.  Rather, she believes, the internet is merely exacerbat104 -
ing longstanding trends of political communication.  That is, Boulianne concludes 105
that the internet is a new vehicle for political communication, not a revolutionary force 
on it. 

	 As this thesis is intended to describe and explain rather than normatively advo-
cate any side of such a debate, any further supposition must be speculative in nature. 
But to the extent that we can understand online political communication not as a par-
adigm shift, but a potent exacerbation of previously existing trends, further discussion 
might prove useful to the end of identifying tensions within the literatures discussed 
thus far. This section will begin by highlighting three “pressure points” within the litera-
tures I have surveyed that implicate future research: (1) the potential increase in net-
work homogeneity due to social media, (2) the transmission of expertise in the social 
media age, and (3) news media’s credibility problem, as fostered by new forms of me-
dia. Necessarily, these pressures contribute to- and are exacerbated by- one another. 
Thus, the final portion of this section will be a discussion of potential ways in which 
 Boulianne, Shelley. "Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A Meta-Analysis of Research." 104
Political Communication 26.2 (2009): 193-211.
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they interact. Importantly, any such discussion must be speculative in nature. That 
said, I do hope that my treatment of their potential interactions will prove useful to the 
end of identifying fruitful intersections for future research.

A. Network homogeneity 

	 Mutz (2001) speculated that discussant networks tend to be far more homoge-
nous than news media agendas.  This was, she believed, because news media out106 -
lets need to apply to vast swaths of the population in order to satisfy the pressure 
placed by ratings expectations. Such a position relies on the supposedly impersonal 
nature of news media- that is, news media has less of a vested interest in getting along 
with specific individuals, and thus caters messages to broader audiences than inter-
personal discussion networks can allow or account for.

	 As early as 1996, scholars like Negroponte were wary of homogeneity within po-
litical discussion networks increasing in the internet age.  If the MIT media lab data 107
from Twitter use during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign is any indication, social 
media has provided a platform that permits the existence of alarmingly dense discus-
sion networks.  The Pew Research Center’s State of the Media 2016 reveals that 31 108
percent of social media users believe that the news posted by their friends or family 
presents diverse opinions, and 35 percent believe posts from the same group are ho-
 Mutz, Diana C. "Facilitating Communication across Lines of Political Difference: The 106
Role of Mass Media." American Political Science Review 95.1 (2001): 97-114.
 Negroponte, Nicholas. Being digital. Vintage, 1996.107
 https://www.media.mit.edu/articles/parallel-narratives-clinton-and-trump-supporters-really-108
don-t-listen-to-each-other-on-twitter/
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mogenous in content.  Of the latter subset, 69 percent would value to more opposing 109
views in their online social circle, and while 30 percent are content with 
homogeneity.  Bind all of this with mounting evidence that we are massively unskilled 110
at self-assessment, and it appears safe to say that discussion network homogeneity is 
a characteristic of political discourse in the social media era. 

	 Though any theory of why such networks have arisen must be speculative, find-
ings from the literature on moral psychology may shed light on how such homogenous 
discussion networks have arisen. Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague (2002) found that 
the influence of any message is dependent on the context of messages previously 
voiced within a given network.  Thus, discussion networks may be subject to a 111
“snowball eﬀect” of similar messages, especially in the ever-increasing absence of dis-
senting voices. 

	 Within these bounds, it appears that particular kinds of messages would be 
more eﬀective at creating homogenous networks than others. Specifically, research 
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pation.  Threat promotes convergence of identities and, further, the less diverse the 112113
identities with in a group are, the lower tolerance for out-groups will be.  Finally, evi114 -
dence suggests that personal, anecdotal experiences highly influence the political 
views of citizens.  
115
	 These things in mind, it seems likely that any interface that permits the mass 
promulgation of threat to specific audiences, provides a forum for anecdotal experi-
ences, and allows people to control who their online neighbors are is an interface 
primed to bring about the rise of homogenous discussion networks. 

	 Social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook meet each of these criteria. 
Their widespread use places pressure on previous literature concerning network ho-
mogeneity. It lends to mounting evidence that the “neighborhood view” of political dis-
course discussed in the moral psychology literature is, at best, in need of review in the 
social media age.

	 Another area that the advent of social media places pressure on previous litera-
ture is the transmission of expertise in political discussion networks. Prior research has 
suggested that political eﬃcacy, knowledge, and participation are positively correlated 
 Levine, Robert A., and Donald T. Campbell. "Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic atti112 -
tudes and group conflict." New York: Wiley. 242 Social identity: international perspectives 
(1972): 271-299.
 Leach, Colin Wayne, Aarti Iyer, and Anne Pedersen. "Anger and guilt about ingroup advan113 -
tage explain the willingness for political action." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32.9 
(2006): 1232-1245.
 Roccas, Sonia, and Marilynn B. Brewer. "Social identity complexity." Personality and Social 114
Psychology Review 6.2 (2002): 88-106.
 Walsh, Katherine Cramer, and K. Cramer. "Talking about race: Community dialogues and the 115
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with online exposure to political information.  Huckfeldt (2001) held that discussants 116
were fairly adept at evaluating who is an expert and who is not.  Finally, prior re117 -
search held that expert voices are heeded because they speak, and are listened to, 
more often, not because discussants weigh their views more heavily.  
118
	 These things leave open the possibility that an interface on which expert and 
non-expert discussants are given equal time could stultify the transmission of expertise 
by saturating discussants with non-expert opinions. I suspect that social media exac-
erbates this trend, due to the horizontal nature of its presentation. That is, platforms 
like Facebook, through their “news feed” structures, place the opinions of uneducated 
peers and Noam Chomsky on a level playing field. What’s more, expert opinions are 
often linked to articles, thus requiring intentional eﬀort to access. Not only would such 
an interface destabilize the ways in which expertise has traditionally been transmitted, 
it would also place pressure on previous research such as Huckfeldt’s 2001 study eval-
uating discussants’ ability to identify experts. In this way, the widespread use of social 
media warrants new research evaluating individuals’ abilities to identify experts. 

	 Finally, the rise of highly individualized social media potentially pressures the 
common narrative that news media must remain objective in order to be valued by 
broad audiences. As McPherson (2015) highlighted, social media has paradoxical ef-
fects on media credibility to the extent that while it democratizes the construction and 
 Kenski, Kate, and Natalie Jomini Stroud. "Connections between Internet use and 116
political efficacy, knowledge, and participation." Journal of broadcasting & 
electronic media 50.2 (2006): 173-192.
 Huckfeldt, Robert. "The social communication of political expertise." American Journal 117
of Political Science (2001): 425-438.
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dissemination of news, that very expansion might undermine the integrity of the infor-
mation flows on which news media has been traditionally based.  Further, Bryant and 119
Miron’s research posited that this newly interactive nature of online news media pres-
sures conventional media into forgoing substance for entertainment, a trend which fur-
ther destabilizes the traditionally-stable credibility of media institutions.  It may well 120
be the case that, as Bouza held, the democratization of discourse will serve to sensa-
tionalize media content, further destabilizing the credibility of news media 
institutions.  Findings such as these place pressure on conventional narratives that 121
maintain media’s objectivity and credibility.

	 Importantly, these pressures are multiply caused and their eﬀects are often inter-
related. For example, a rise in network homogeneity and a destabilization of expertise, 
taken together, might place pressure on Kenski and Stroud’s 2006 study that found 
positive correlations between internet usage and political eﬃcacy, knowledge, and par-
ticipation.  The sensationalism of media content might well, as Bimber (1998) be122 -
lieved, contribute to interest-based group politics that foster homogenous networks.  A 
decreased sense of trust in the credibility of media might well contribute to the crisis of 
 McPherson, E., 2015. Digital Human Rights Reporting by Civilian Witnesses: Surmounting 119
the Verification Barrier. In R. A. Lind, ed. Produsing Theory in a Digital World 2.0: The Intersec-
tion of Audiences and Production in Contemporary Theory. New York, NY: Peter Lang Publish-
ing, pp. 193–209.
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of communication 54.4 (2004): 662-704.
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expertise. Of course, the pressures placed on previous literature by social media are 
not limited to ones that I have noted, nor are they conclusive evidence that existing lit-
erature is incorrect. They do, however, point to a need for future investigation in their 
respective domains. 

	 The pressures I have identified are similar in kind, to the extent that they suggest 
that new forms of political media have not reoriented the psychology of news media 
consumption, but rather further revealed and exacerbated existing trends. Past pre-
senting a need for future research, they also have implications for policymakers. 

	 The health of any representative democracy, in consequential ways, rests on the 
idea of an informed public, one that invests time consulting data and researching can-
didates in order to cast votes that reflect that which they value and have reason to val-
ue. I believe that the pressures identified in this thesis are similar in kind to the extent 
that they concern ways that the idea of an informed public is increasingly debased in 
the online era. 

	 Given the advent of both the twenty-four hour news cycle and social media, citi-
zens have easier access to news than ever before. However, given the proliferation of 
media channels in the online era, the news that they receive is, arguably, less credible 
than news promulgated under more traditional media models. This implies that pro-
gressively, the question of whether not an informed public exists is becoming less im-
portant relative to another question: what does the increasingly politicized term in-
formed mean?

	 The potential crisis of expertise brought on, in part, by social media has massive 
ramifications for the flow of political information. Combined with a destabilization of 
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longstanding political institutions and the creation of dense political discussion net-
works in which ideological homogeneity thrives, the integrity of informed democratic 
participation is under pressure. This pressure will manifest in the processes of policy 
formation to the extent that it has the capability of aﬀecting the type of messages that 
will successfully elect candidates. As ideological homogeneity thrives in discussion 
networks, it is not unreasonable to expect participants to increasingly expect candi-
dates to represent the ideological purity reflected in discussion networks. In this way, 
one function of this pressure lies in its radicalizing power, to the extent that it potential-
ly pushes partisan policy away from the center, thus impeding the path of compromise 
and contributing to political polarization. 

	 Apart from the above implications, these tensions raise important questions for 
policy makers in the present. If the news media is a political institution, what responsi-
bility do policymakers have to regulate its behavior? Should internet news policy delve 
into the realm of regulating content purporting to be objective? Does a healthy democ-
racy depend on measures that protect a diversity of informed views? The pressures 
placed on political discourse by new forms of media that I have discussed, I hold, per-
mit policy makers- impel them, even- to take such questions seriously. 
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